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Abstract
Secure property rights are considered a key determinant of economic development.
However, evaluation of the causal eﬀects of land titling is a diﬃcult task. Since 2004, a
program called “Papel Passado” has issued titles to more than over 85,000 families and has
the goal to reach 750,000. This paper examines the direct impact of securing a property
title on child labor force participation. This study uses a comparison between two close
and similar communities in the City of Osasco case. The key point of this case is that
some units participate in the program and others do not. Estimates, generated using
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence econometric technique suggest that titling results in a substantial
decrease in child labor force participation for the families that received the title compared
with the others. This ﬁndings are relevant for future policy tools for dealing with
informality and how it aﬀects economic growth.
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Resumo
A obtenção dos direitos de propriedade é considerada um determinante para o
desenvolvimento econômico. Entretanto, a avaliação dos efeitos do título de propriedade
é uma tarefa difícil. Desde 2004, o programa intitulado “Papel Passado” vem concedendo
escrituras para mais de 85.000 famílias e ainda objetiva alcançar a marca de 750.000
famílias beneﬁciadas. Este artigo examina o impacto direto da obtenção do título de
propriedade sobre a participação de crianças no mercado de trabalho. O estudo utiliza uma
comparação entre duas comunidades vizinhas na cidade de Osasco. As estimações, geradas
a partir da técnica econométrica Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence, sugerem uma diminuição
substancial na participação do trabalho infantil para as famílias que obtiveram a escritura
em comparação com as outras. Tais observações são relevantes para políticas públicas
futuras com respeito a informalidade e como esta afeta o crescimento econômico.
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1. Introduction
The role played by private rights in the economic development of the Western
world has been powerfully documented by economic historians such as North and
Thomas (1973). The fragility of property rights is considered a crucial obstacle for
the economic development (North 1990). The main argument is that individuals
underinvested if others can seize the fruits of their investment (Demsetz 1967).
Torstensson (1994) and Goldsmith (1995) found a signiﬁcantly positive association
between secure property rights and economic growth.
In such a context, strengthening economic institutions is widely argued to foster
investment in physical and human capital, bolster growth performance, reduce
macroeconomic volatility and encourage an equitable and eﬃcient distribution of
economic opportunity (Acemoglu et al. 2002). In current developing world scenario,
a pervasive sign of feeble poverty rights are the 930 million people living in urban
dwellings without possessing formal titles of the plots of land they occupy (United
Nations, Habitat Report, 2005). The lack of formal property rights constitutes a
severe limitation for the poor. The absence of formal titles creates constraints to
use land as collateral to access the credit markets (Besley 1995).
De Soto (2000) emphasizes that the lack of property rights limits the
transformation of the wealth owned by the poor into capital. By contrast property
title could allow the poor to collateralize the land. Field and Torero (2002)
mentioned that this credit could be invested as capital in productive projects,
promptly increasing labor productivity and income. Among policy-makers as well,
property titling is increasingly considered one of the most eﬀective forms for
targeting the poor and encouraging economic growth (Baharoglu 2002; Binswanger
et al. 1995). Figure 1 sketches the mechanisms that property titling causes economic
growth.
The most famous example is Peru in Latin America. The Peruvian government
issued property titles to 1.2 million urban households during the 1990’s. In Asia,
millions of titles are being issued in Vietnam and Cambodia as shown in the The
Economist magazine in March 15th 2007 edition. The same edition brings in the
front page: “Property Rights: China’s Next Revolution”. The survey shows that
China intends to put into place the most ambitious land-titling program in the
World’s History and includes such initiative as one of the main points of the Chinese
economic development model.
In Brazil, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva announced during his ﬁrst week in
oﬃce, back in 2003, a massive plan to title 750,000 families all over the country.
The Brazilian Federal Government created a program called “Papel Passado”. Since
launched, the program has spent US$ 15 million per year from the Federal Budget,
providing titles to over 85,000 and reaching 49 cities in 17 diﬀerent Brazilian states.
The oﬃcial goal of the program is “to develop land title in Brazil and promote
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Fig. 1. Land registration
 
Source: World Bank, 2008.
an increase in quality of life for the Brazilian population”. However, the country
still faces a very diﬃcult scenario regarding land property rights: the Brazilian
government estimates that 12 million people live under illegal urban conditions
(IBGE, 2007).
Furthermore, child labor is a major issue faced by the global economy. In Brazil,
about 5.4 million children and teenagers between 5 and 17 years old do work in
the streets as PNAD (an annual research on random households in Brazil done by
IBGE, 2007) shows.
This paper investigates the impact of property rights on labor markets by
analyzing household response regarding child labor force participation to an
exogenous change in formal ownership status in Brazil. In particular, the paper
assesses the value to a squatter household of increases in tenure security associated
with obtaining a property title in terms of hours of child labor supply.
Eﬀects of land titling have been documented by several studies. A partial listing
includes Jimenez (1985), Alston et al. (1996) and Lanjouw and Levy (2002) on
real estate values. Besley (1995), Jacoby et al. (2002), Brasselle et al. (2002) and
Do and Iyer (2003) on agricultural investment. Place and Migot-Adholla (1998),
Carter and Olinto (2003) and Field and Torero (2002) on credit access, housing
investment and income.
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In urban settings, the value of property titles has been measured far less often
and empirical work has focused on real estates prices. A major contribution is
from the of paper by Jimenez (1984), involving an equilibrium model of urban
squatting in which it is shown that the diﬀerence in unit housing prices between
non-squatting (formal) sector of a city and its squatting (informal) sector reﬂects
the premium associated with security. The accompanying empirical analysis of real
estate markets in Philippines ﬁnds equilibrium prices diﬀerentials between formal
and informal sector unit dwelling prices in the range of 58.0% and greater for lower
income groups and larger households.
For Besley (1995), the ﬁndings were ambiguous, land rights appear to have a
positive eﬀect on agricultural investment in the Ghananian region of Angola but less
noticeable impact on the region of Wassa. Using a similar approach, Jacoby et al.
(2002) ﬁnd positive eﬀects in China, where as Brasselle et al. (2002) ﬁnd no eﬀects
for Burkina Faso. Field and Torero (2002), in Peru, exploits timing variability in
the regional implementation of the Peruvian titling program using cross-sectional
data on past and future title recipients midway through the project, and also
ﬁnds positive eﬀects, particularly in the credit access and housing investments.
In Brazil, Andrade (2006) using cross-section data from a sample of 200 families
of the Comunidade do Caju, an urban poor community in Rio de Janeiro, has
demonstrated an increase eﬀect on the income of those that had received the
property title.
A common obstacle, faced by all studies mentioned above, is how to measure
the inﬂuence of tenure security considering the potential endogeneity of ownership
rights as pointed by Demsetz (1967) and Alchian and Demsetz (1973). Direct
evidence of this is provided by Miceli et al. (2001), who analyze the extent of
endogeneity of formal agricultural property rights in Kenya.
In order to isolate the causal role of ownership security, this study uses a natural
experiment, by comparing two neighborhoods in the City of Osasco (a town with
650,000 people located in the São Paulo – Brazil metropolitan area) which are
very similar between each other in many aspects. Osasco is part of the Papel
Passado program and has 6,000 families living under urban property informality.
One of them,Jardim Canaã, was fortunate to receive the titles in 2007, the other,
Jardim DR, only will be part of the program schedule in 2012, and for that reason
became the control group. Such approach enables a comparison of households in a
neighborhood reached by the program with households in a neighborhood not yet
reached.
The present research is based on a panel data from a random sample from Jardim
Canaã and Jardim DR, and it is produced from a two-stage survey with focus on
the property right issue. The ﬁrst part of the survey was collected in March 2007,
before titles had been issued to Jardim Canaã, and the second was collected in
August 2008, almost one year and half after the titles were awarded. As a matter
of fact, that is the main methodological diﬀerence from other studies and therefore
may potentially generate more robust and trutful results. As Ravallion et al. (2005)
argues that the best ex-post evaluations are designed and implemented ex-ante –
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often side-by-side with the program itself.
Based on the ﬁrst survey, 95.0% of the participants (from Canaã and DR)
were not aware about receiving land titles and the meaning of it (which avoids
any behavior deviation generated by the expectation of having a land title). In the
second stage of the survey, most of households that received the land title felt that
such event was relevant for their lifes – see Figure 2 below even not previously
expecting the land title.
Fig. 2. How land title aﬀected household’s life?
Source: Research from the Osasco Land Title Survey – 2008.
Hence, given the speciﬁc focus on non-agricultural households the ﬁrst
contribution of this paper is to shed some light on the value to urban residents and
their families of increased ownership security. As shown, in developing economies
large proportions of urban and rural residents alike lack tenure security. Field
and Torero (2002) demonstrated, presumably because of historic interests in
agricultural investment and related politics of land reform, the majority of both
academic and policy attention to property rights has centered on rural households
tenure security. Nevertheless, in most of the developing world, the population –
and particularly the impoverished population – is increasingly urban.
Second, this research provides a unique panel data by means of a quasi-natural
experiment that helps minimize the endogeneity aspect related to most of the
studies on such subject as property rights.
Third, many aspects have applied to try to explain the reasons of the child
labor. The most common are income, poverty, parent’s level of education, parent’s
previous child labor experience, credit constraints and others. This paper intends
to provide an additional aspect that can be used as part of the child labor causes.
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Finally this paper provides an initial impact measure, in terms of applied
public policy, for the “Papel Passado” program and gives a partial feedback
for policy-makers about the eﬀects of land titling regarding child labor force
participation. Certainly, reducing child labor force participation is one of the
main goals of the Federal and Local Governments. Social programs such as
PETI (Programa de Erradicação de Trabalho Infantil), an initiative that focus
on providing education opportunities for children engaged in labor activities and
extra income for their poor families, is a great example of Government’s concern.
Understanding the potential positive eﬀects of land titling and property rights in
such subject could be valuable to make any eﬀort related to child labor participation
stronger and more eﬀective.
2. Child Labor Force Participation: The Economic Context
Investing and focusing on human capital development is a critical factor to
increase economic growth, as stated by Becker and Lewis (1973). Given such key
assumption, the United Nations Millennium goals include eliminating child labor
as crucial step into a better and equal world.
According to the International Labour Organization (2002), 246 million children
and teenagers between 5 and 17 years old are engaged in child labor around the
world. Furthermore, 75.0% of them work for their own family activities. Asia, Africa
and Latin America are the continents that host most the child labor in the world.
Asia has the highest number of children in terms of volume but Africa is the leader
relatively to the total size of work force.
In Brazil, data from PNAD (IBGE, 2007) have shown that out of a 44.7 million
population between 5 and 17 years old, 10.8% (4.8 million) are directly involved
in labor child. Northeast is the worst region of Brazil regarding this subject, with
13.4% of 5-17 year population working. By contrast, Southeast holds the lowest
average (7.9%). Such statistics represents a positive evolution over the last 4 years
as Figure 3 shows.
However, child labor is still a major issue for Brazilian policy makers as PNAD
(IBGE, 2007) suggests. For example, 60.0% of the children between 5 and 13 years
old are involved in non-paid activities. In the rural areas of Brazil, 40.0% of the 5-17
years old population works between 30 and 40 hours per week. In the Southeast,
the richest region in the country, 30.0% of the teenagers work at least 40 hours per
week.
Economics has developed a range of potential theories to explain child labor.
Becker and Lewis (1973) argue that child labor is an activity that generates current
beneﬁts in terms of income, but also it creates future costs by reducing study and
leisure. Given that, families evaluate cost-beneﬁts related to sending their children
to school or to work. Rosenzweig (1981) has demonstrated that children’s time
allocation depends on both their own and their parents production capacity besides
the substitution degree of the work force between each other.
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Fig. 3. Occupation level among the 5-17 year-old population (Percentual of total 5-17
population)
Source: IBGE, PNDA 2007.
Basu and Van (1998) have built a model using one basic assumption: luxury.
They consider that poverty is the main factor that makes parents to send children
to work. Hence, children’s time that is not allocated between to generate income is
luxury as school and leisure. However such goods can not be aﬀord by low income
parents. Ray (1999) has created a theory for emerging economies: child labor occurs
mainly because of poverty and credit markets imperfections. He has shown that if
poor families had access to credit, in the presence of high returns for education,
they would be willing to send children to school instead of work. Furthermore,
the same study showed the relationship between income inequality and child labor
under credit constraints. The main conclusion states that a more equal income
distribution would reduce child labor.
Kassouf (2002) have demonstrated that an increase in the household’s income
reduces the probability of child labor and increases the school attendance. Another
element that aﬀects child labor probability is the parent’s education degree.
Bhalotra and Heady (2003) found a negative eﬀect given the mother’s level of
education and the child labor participation in Ghana. The eﬀect the mother’s
education proﬁle is higher comparing with the father. Kassouf (2002), in Brazil,
has obtained the same negative eﬀect. Family composition is another relevant factor
for the particular analysis, Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1994) for Paraguay and
Bhalotra and Heady (2003) for Pakistan, concluded that more people in the family,
higher the chances of having child labor.
Wahba (2002), using data from Egypt, showed a phenomenum denominated
“dynastic poverty traps” which means that the probability of children to be sent
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to work increases 10% when their parents worked during their childhood. Emerson
and Souza (2003) reached the same conclusion and explain such event as “social
norms”: parents that worked during their childhood years face child labor more
naturally. As mentioned earlier, this paper aims to providing an additional element
for that discussion and test the relation between land titling and child labor force
participation using the case of the City of Osasco.
3. Microeconomic Framework: Basics
“I go to work with my children but my wife has to stay to look after the house”
says Mr. Rosivaldo Reis, who sells popcorn and soft drinks in downtown Osasco,
São Paulo, Brazil. Mr. Reis worries that people could size his house when he is
away.
Cockburn (1998) pointed that one of the principal gains of strong property
institutions is to shift the burden of property protection and enforcement away
from individual households and informal communities to the State.
There is little microeconomic evidence documenting the cost of informality
to individual households. Carter and Zegarra (2000), World Bank (2000) and
Field (2007) have noted that, in many settings, informal institutions arise to
compensate for the absence of formal property protection. In such a context, there
is one important mechanism by which it is assumed that tenure security removes
individuals from the labor force and incremental income. Households untitled are
constrained by the need to provide informal policing, both to deter prospective
invaders from invading private properties and to actively participate in community
enforcement eﬀorts to protect neighborhood boundaries.
Hence, an important outcome of titling eﬀorts that eﬀectively increases household
tenure security should allow households and communities to reallocate time,
resources and human talent away from this role.
The acquisition of a property title has a direct value in terms of freeing up hours
of work (and income generation) previously devoted to maintaining tenure security
through informal means.
I (income) = f(w;Hm)
where
w is market wage
Hm is work in the outside market
We assume that:
(i) There is no outside labor market for provision of home/tenure security.
Assuming a missing labor market for the provision of home security is
reasonably justiﬁed by incomplete contracts (there is some risk involved
in employing non-members to guard property – especially in those poor
communities in Brazil);
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(ii) Leisure and home production hours are assumed to be perfect substitutes for
the hours individual spend on property protection;
(iii) All households face a common wage w;
(iv) Household is assumed to maximize per capita leisure and not leisure of
individual members;
(v) Household talent, Φ, and endowment, E, are assumed to be ﬁxed.
Now, let the time spent at home be Z such that
Z = Hh + L
where
Hh is work at home
L is the household leisure
The value of work at home is given by a production function q(Hh), which is
increasing and concave. If n is the number of members at a determined househod
i, then l is leisure per capita and x is consumption per capita. Household utility is
concave and an increasing function of per capita leisure, per capita consumption,
and home security tenure, S, also concave. The parameter Ω is exogenous and
designs household formal property rights. Therefore:
U (x,l,S;Φ,E),
where S = S(Z,Ω).
In this problem the endogenous variables are Hh, Hm, x, l, and S. Also there
are two restricthing to deal with. The ﬁrst is the budget constraing given by:





p is the goods price
X is the household consumption.
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The ﬁrst order condition, assuming that Hm > 0;Hh > 0, and Hm + Hh < T)
are:













The ﬁrst equation establishes that, at the optimum, households equate the
marginal value of an additional hour of outside labor with the marginal utility
of leisure. The second equation states that they also equate the marginal utility of
leisure with the marginal value of an additional hour of work at home.
Given such a context, demand functions of work hours in the outside market and
in home production depend on Ω and w:
Hh = Hh (Ω,w),Hm = Hm (Ω,w)
Spending time on security, decreases consumption and leisure, so it is reasonable
to assume that UxS ≥ 0 and UlS ≥ 0. By spending time on leisure, then the
consumption must decrease, such as Uxl ≥ 0. Thus, household’s ability to increase
security by staying close to home implies that optimal allocation of work hours








For households involved in both type of labor, an increase in formal tenure
security decreases work hours at home and increases work hours in the outside
market.
The conditions imply that by strengthening formal property rights decreases
work hours inside the house and increases time spent outside, reﬂecting the fact
that an exogenous increase in the formal property protection lowers the opportunity
cost of outside labor and makes stronger the probability to increase current income
of those households as presented on I (income) = f (w;Hm).
In the empirical analysis, data limitations prevent us from separating
employment hours inside and outside home. Given that, and with the respect to the
net eﬀect of a property title on total labor hours, the model predicts that households
with zero home production hours ex-ante (Hh = 0) will increase total household
work hours by some positive amount in response to land title and property rights
and decreases child labor hours.
3.1. Labor supply of children
An extension of the model, and signiﬁcant part of the present study approach,
incorporates diﬀerences in the household supply of adult and child labor when
only adults contribute to home security provision. This extension formalizes the
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intuitive idea that, if adults have comparative advantage in the provision of home
security, in the absence of property rights, children will substitute for adults in the
labor market. In this case, while total household labor hours rise with an increase
in formal rights – as demonstrated above, child labor hours will actually fall.
Here, n = na + nc, where na and nc are the number of adult and children
in household, respectively. The variables la and lc are per capita adult and child
leisure, so La and Lc are total adult and child leisure. Finally Ta and Tc are total






wa(Ta − La) + wc(Tc − Lc) = X,
where wi is the wage of i = a,c.


























From these conditions it can be shown that, for all interior optima, ∂lc
∂Ω > 0,
and ∂la
∂Ω < 0. Households in which children are labor force participants, child labor
hours will fall and adult labor hours will rise with an increase in tenure security. For
all other households, adult labor hours will rise and child labor hours will remain
at zero. Thus, given a positive amount of ex-ante child labor, the aggregate number
of child labor hours will unambiguously fall, while the number of adult hours rises
with an increase in property rights.
Although this model focuses on optimal labor allocation, the income eﬀect that
follows from relaxing the household time constraint provides a plausible alternative
explanation for a decrease in child labor with an increase in formal rights, and one
that has been proposed by other authors. In particular, a decrease in the child
labor would follow from the luxury and axioms of the Basu and Van (1998) model
of labor supply, in which children can substitute for adults in the labor market and
a family will send children to the labor markets only if the family’s income from
non-child labor sources falls below some threshold amount.
4. The Data
The empirical analysis of household labor supply and income responses to
changes in formal property rights relies on a data survey developed especially and
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exclusively for this paper in the City of Osasco, an important town in the São Paulo
metropolitan area with a population of 654,000 people.
The Federal Government has chosen Osasco as one of the participants of the
“Papel Passado”, a program that intends to provide land titles to families living
under illegal conditions – given its relevant economic and social role.
The city of Osasco has 30,000 people (about 6,000 families) living under informal
conditions, representing almost 4.5% of its total population. The program timetable
for Osasco establishes that all the communities under illegal situation will be part
of the “Papel Passado” during the period between 2007 and 2014 (the main reason
because all communities are not receiving the land title at the same time relies on
the fact that ﬁscal resources are limited in time). Oﬃcially, according to the Osasco
City Hall, there is no priority, and the choice on the community to be beneﬁted
follows a random criteria. Unoﬃcial sources from local communities in Osasco
express the feelings that a “political” agenda might be present in the decision.
Anyway, the ﬁrst community to receive the land title was Jardim Canaã, in
2007, a place with 500 families. The closest neighborhood of Jardim Canaã is a
community called DR, with 450 families. The DR’s households will be part of the
“Papel Passado” program schedule in 2011. Hence, the data of this paper consist
in 326 households distributed randomly across Jardim Canaã and DR (185 from
Jardim Canaã and 141 from DR).
4.1. Minimizing endogeneity bias concerns
Given the particular nature of the research conducted in the city of Osasco,
some steps were taken to minimize the bias related with the data collected. First
of all, a technique to sample randomly 326 households follows the methodology by
Bolfarine and Bussab (2005). The approach basically chooses 150 households (from
the Canaã and DR) that have the closest birth dates (day and month). Each one of
the three ﬁeld researcher then got 50 names initially as ﬁrst base 1 . After reaching
each of those households, they could go and pick the third and the ﬁfth neighbor
on the right hand side.
Second, Heckman and Hotz (1989) state that constructing counterfactuals is
the central problem in the literature about evaluating social programs, given the
impossibility of observing the same person in both states at the same time. The goal
of any program evaluation is to compare only comparable people. So, an important
step to minimize such issue is to use a comparison between two neighborhoods
(Jardim Canaã and DR) with very similar characteristics. Canaã and DR are not
only oﬃcial neighbors but there is no physical “borderline” between them, since
both are geographically united (if someone walks there, it is hard to identify the
boundaries – even for the local households).
1 The ﬁeld researchers are not from Osasco.
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One of them, Jardim Canaã, fortunate to receive the titles in 2007, is qualiﬁed for
the paper proposal as the main sample. The other, DR, part of the program schedule
in 2011, is the control group. Such approach enables a comparison of households
in a neighborhood reached by the program with households in a neighborhood not
yet reached and gives the possibility to produce a panel data.
Another aspect to be mentioned about the data collected is that produced a
unique match within same geographic area which helped to assure that comparison
units come from the same economic environment. Rubin and Thomas (2000)
indicate that impact estimates based on full (unmatched) samples are generally
more biased, and less robust to miss-speciﬁcation of the regression function than
those based on matched samples.
Under such conditions, it was produced from a two-stage survey focused on
the property right issue. However, to minimize bias, the way that the survey was
prepared and conducted by the researchers does not provide any direct information
for the households what exactly the research is about. Oﬃcially for the people
interviewed, the study was about City of Osasco general living conditions.
The survey was based on a 39 questions questionnaire applied to the 326 families
randomly sampled as described earlier. The survey instrument, in many questions
and methodologies, closely mirrors the IBGE Living Standards Measurement
Survey (PNAD – Pesquisa Nacional de Amostra de Domicílios do Instituto
Brasileiro de Geograﬁa e Estatística) in content, and therefore contains a variety
of information on household and individual characteristics. In addition, there are
six questions designed to provide information on the range of economic, social and
personal beneﬁts associated with property formalization. 2
The ﬁrst stage of the survey was conducted in March 2007, before titles had
been issued to Jardim Canaã. The second was collected in August 2008, almost
one year and half after the ﬁrst title had been issued. There were 98.0% of recall
– or 2.0% missing, which means that almost all households interviewed in the ﬁrst
survey were found and interviewed during the second stage. The reason regarding
such time gap gave the opportunity to all households interviewed during the ﬁrst
survey stage to have, at least, 1 year with the land title. The exactly dates that
each household interviewed received the title were provided by the 2nd Cartório de
Osasco (2nd Osasco’s Oﬃce of Registration) along with the formal authorization
from the Osasco’s City Hall to conduct the research.
Heckman and Hotz (1989) add that it is not necessary to sample the same person
in diﬀerent periods – just persons from the same population. Therefore this paper
has clearly the advantage that the same households were tracked over time to
form a panel data set. Ravallion et al. (1995) argue that making a panel data
with such characteristics should be able to satisfactorily address the problem of
miss-matching errors from incomplete data, a very common issue regarding public
policy evaluation.
2 The questionnaries are available under request.
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Furthermore, we emphasize again another aspect that helps minimize the
selection bias. Based on the ﬁrst survey, 95.0% of the participants (from Canaã
and DR) did not expect to receive any land title, i.e., they were not aware about
“Papel Passado” and the meaning of it. Such lack of information about the subject
provides the study a non-bias aspect regarding the importance of property rights
because it avoids a potential behavior deviation from households included in the
program.
Finally, the study also tracks the households that moved outside both
communities to check whether the land title eﬀect stands. From the original sample,
8% of the households that received the land title have moved away from Canaã by
selling their property. The local authorities in Osasco believe that 8% is lower than
they expected, but it seems to be high when compared to the control group where
only 1 household (out of 140) has moved away during the same period.
5. Basic Findings – Child Labor Force
This study has used basically four questions to address the issue of child along
the survey. The ﬁrst question was: “Do you have any children?”. Combined sample
and control group, about 75.0% of the households declared to have children (about
73.0% sample and 76.0% control group).
After the initial question mentioned above, the survey included the following:
a) “Are there any children helping in the familiar income? How many? (under 18
years old)”,
b) “How many hours they work daily?” and
c) “How many days per week minors work?”.
On top of that, from those households that have children, 25.5% responded that
have minors helping the familiar income.
Additionally, the diagram below summarizes the household’s answers (2007 and
2008) about weekly hours of child labor. The main issue that arises is related to
the fact that for the sample is visible that children are working lower hours (and
even households that have children working in 2007 changed path in the survey’s
second round) and for the control group the scenario gets worst over time.
6. Econometric Model
6.1. Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator
The econometric method is the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerence estimator, also known
as DD. As Bertrand et al. (2004) deﬁne, Diﬀ-in-Diﬀ consists of identifying the
eﬀects of a speciﬁc intervention or treatment (often a passage of a law). The idea
is to compare the outcome before and after the treatment between a treated and
non-treated (control) group.
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Fig. 4. Are there any child/teenager helping in family income? How many?
 
 
Source: Research from the Osasco Land Title Survey – 2008.
Fig. 5. Child labor force hours worked weekly × Number of households (Sample)
 
Source: Research from the Osasco Land Title Survey – 2008.
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Fig. 6. Child labor force hours worked weekly × Number of households (Control group)
 
Source: Research from the Osasco Land Title Survey – 2008.
Heckman and Hotz (1989) state that the parameter most commonly invoked in
the program evaluation literature, although not the one actually estimated in social
experiments, is the eﬀect of randomly picking a person with characteristics X and
moving from a non-treated situation to a treated one. To see that, let ygt be the
outcome at t from group g, where the participant group is indexed by g = 1, and
the non participant group is indexed by g = 0:
E (y1t − y0t|X). (3)
In practice, however, most non-experimental and experimental studies do not
estimate such a quantity. Instead, studies usually estimate the eﬀect of treatment
on the treated.
E (y1t − y0t|X,d = 1) ≡ E (y1t − y0t)1 , (4)
where
d = 1 is the treated group;
d = 0 is the control group.
In what follows, we omit the dependence on X.
Given the data characteristics, this particular study aims, as previously
mentioned, to provide a comparison between treated and untreated to estimate
impact of treatment on the treated with a counterfactual. Heckman and Hotz (1989)
pointed it is impossible to form change in outcomes between treated and untreated
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states for anyone. However, it is possible to form one or the other terms for everyone
with the counterfactual mechanism.
We can decompose the former expression into two groups, treated and control,
if there are at least two time periods. That is the case of our data, so let t > t′.
Then the DD estimator is given by:
E (y1t − y0t)1 = E (y1t − y0t′)1 − E (y0t − y0t′)1 +
+E (y0t − y0t′)0 − E (y0t − y0t′)0 .
We must assume that:
E (y0t − y0t′)1 = E (y0t − y0t′)0 ,
which means that the time variation in the averages of the two groups, treated and
control, although non-participant are the same.
Hence:
E (y1t − y0t)1 = E (y1t − y0t′)1 − E (y0t − y0t′)0 .
The expression may be simpliﬁed, if one notice that the control and treated
groups at t′ are exactly the same, because nothing happened by then. So rewrite
(y0t′|d = 1) ≡ y1
t′ and (y0t′|d = 0) ≡ y0
t′. Consequently:





























Therefore, one can write the estimator as a switching regression:
∆y = d∆y1 + (1 − d)∆y0 = ∆y0 + d(∆y1 − ∆y0),
where d = 1 for the treated group, and 0 for the control group.
If ∆yg = ∆xgβg + ug, we have:
∆y = ∆x0β0 + d(∆x1β1 − ∆x0β0) + ε,
where ε = u0 + d(u1 − u0)
When β1 − β0 = 0, but the constant, α, we have:
∆y = ∆x0β0 + dα + ε,
where α is the parameter of interest.
6.2. The regression equation
Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence estimates and their standard error, according to Greene
(2002), most often derive from using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) in repeated
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cross sections (or a panel) data on individuals in treatment and control groups
(no treatment) for a period before and after a speciﬁc intervention. Meyer (1995)
argues that the great appeal of DD estimation comes from its simplicity as well
its potential to circumvent many of the endogeneity problems that typically arise
when making comparisons between individuals.
The standard DD estimates the following regression:
∆yi = ∆x0iβ0 + diα + εi, (5)
where i indexes the household sampled.
The estimated impact of the intervention is the OLS estimate b α. Standard
errors used to form conﬁdence interval for b α are usually OLS standard errors
sometimes corrected to account correlation of shocks within each year. Considering
the data characteristics mentioned earlier, this study will assume that the estimated
coeﬃcient of intervention is variable (given xi) but does not help to determine
program participation (land title were given randomly and households were mostly
unaware about receiving the title).
Hence, this speciﬁcation is a common generalization of the most basic DD, and
it will be the foundation for this particular study econometric technique. The basic
assumption is that changes in outcome variable over time would have been exactly
the same in both treatment and control group in the absence of intervention.
6.3. Land title speciﬁcation
The dependent variable is weekly hours of work of child labor force yit (the
outcome of interest for household i at time t). The dependent variable would be
posted as the diﬀerence among weekly hours of child labor in 2008 and 2007. Then
the basic regression is:
∆yi = β0 + diα + β1∆Hm
ai + β2∆Yi + β3∆ni + β′∆xi + εi
where
Hm
ai is the hours worked outside the market by adults in household i
Yi is the income of household i;
ni is the number of people in household i;
xi are other controls.
The coeﬃcient α is the estimated of program eﬀect, which provides a measure of
conditional average diﬀerence in time worked by child households in program area
versus the non-program area.
In addition, xi includes the following controls: sex (dummy), marital status
(dummy, example: single) and ethnicity (dummy, example: African Brazilian).
Another set of variables included to include ﬁxed eﬀects, according to Becker and
Lewis (1973) suggestion, are level of income – measured in terms of minimum wage.
Furthermore, weekly hours of adult work is an essential variable to understand child
labor according to Rosenzweig (1981).
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Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1994) for Paraguay, Grootaert (1998) for Gana
and Heady (2003) for Pakistan, all of them concluded that the more people in the
family, the higher the chances of having child labor. Given such framework, number
of household members is also included. The same applies for the years of education
of the family head. For income, weekly hours, number of household members and
years of education, also the diﬀerence between the survey collection results in 2008
and 2007 is applied.
As a robustness check, this study also estimates a regression including the
households that moved from Canaã (households that got the title, sold the property
and moved right away). The goal is to check whether the land title still has positive
eﬀect even considering those who are not living in the original community.
Of course, we are willing to test the following hypothesis:
H0 : α = 0 × H1 : α < 0,
that is, whether the land titling decreased the hours worked by children.
7. Results
The basic statistics results are presented in Table 1 (Sample Means). Consistent
with the study basic ﬁndings, one main aspects demands special attention.
The average weekly hours of child labor force has decreased from the program
households and increased for the non-program. Additionally, for land title owners,
weekly hours worked of adults increase more. Such could provide a potential signal
that child labor is being substituted by adult work.
Regarding the time of work of children, one can see a decrease in the hour
of the participant group (about 3 hours) and an increase in the hours of the
non-participant group (about 2.8) hours. A possible explanation for that eﬀect
is there to be a substitution for children from non program participants. Taking
that for granted, then one must conclude at least the following: ﬁrst, the program
indeed removes children from the treated group from work, and makes them better
oﬀ. Second, children from the non participant group substitute for the others and
may increase their household income. That is not desirable, but it is likely to make
them better oﬀ. This hypothesis is not tested, though. Our questionnaire does not
reach the level of details to conclude whether there was that kind of substitution.
On the other hand, the DD calculates the diﬀerence between “after” and “before”
values of the mean outcomes for each treatment and control group. The diﬀerence
between mean diﬀerences is the impact estimate. In the table above, the impact
estimate for children labor hours weekly is −5.8 hours.
Econometric results appear in Table 1. This study estimates include the entire
set of regressors consistent with the current theory regarding child labor and land
title and the data collected during the survey. In such speciﬁcation, the estimate
of the land title α coeﬃcient is −6.08, with a robust standard error of 0.93.
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Table 1
Sample means – With all households that have children
Pre-program t
′ Post-program t
Ia Ib(d = 0) Ic IIa IIb IIc
d = 1 d = 0 d = 1 d = 0
(program) (non-program) |t△| (program) (non-program) |t△|
Mean age 42.0 45.0 -3.0 42.8 45.9 -3.1
Time in residency 146.2 158.4 -12.1 157.8 175.0 -17.1
(#months)
Households number 3.8 4.0 -0.2 3.9 4.1 -0.2
(#member)
Number of rooms 3.3 3.7 -0.4 3.3 3.7 -0.3
Income 2.0 3.0 -1.0 2.0 3.0 -1.0
(#MW)
Years of education 9.0 5.0 4.0 9.0 5.0 4.0
Hours worked weekly 9.8 9.2 0.5 19.5 10.0 9.5




Furthermore, as expected from a DD regression, other coeﬃcients such as
sex, ethinicity, years of education, household member and hours worked weekly
presented not signiﬁcant results. Such outcome also helps to support the child
labor variable result.
This outcome is highly consistent with our hypothesis, that property rights (Land
Title) decreased child labor by 6.08 hours worked per week. With a t-statistic of
over 5, the coeﬃcient is diﬀerent from zero at any reasonable level of statistical
signiﬁcance.
The robustness part of the table provides our robustness check, adding (as
mentioned previously) to the regression analysis, households that moved. The
robustness outcome not only remains but also makes it signiﬁcant (−6.04). This
result should help to reinforce the conclusion that land titling has a positive eﬀect
on individuals, and not only on property.
Hence, the eﬀect of land titling, given the conditions and variables applied, is
clearly positive, and helps minimize the number of weekly hours worked by children
in the case of Osasco.
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Table 2
T test for the diﬀerence of means for covariates in 2007
Variables Non-program Program Diﬀerence
(p-value)
Mean age 45.0 42.0 0.05
Mean age squared 2047.1 1757.8 0.05
Sex 0.3 0.3 0.4
Marital status 0.2 0.2 0.7
Ethinicity 0.3 0.4 0.4




Sex*Marital status 0.5 0.5 0.9
Ethinicity*Marital status 0.9 1.0 0.4
Weekly hours worked of adult work 9.2 9.8 0.7
Income (BRL) 1,520.0 807.5 0.05
Child labor hours weekly 9.1 3.5 0.15
Source: Research from the Osasco Land Title Survey.
(Currency 12/31/2008, 1 USD=1.75 BRL. Source: Central Bank of Brazil)
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Table 3
Child labor and land title
Independent variables Dependent variables
Child labor
(hours worked weekly) Robustness check







African Brazilian -0.90* -0.91*
(0.84) (0.84)
Years of education 0.17 0.16
(0.10) (0.10)
Households number -0.45 -0.45
(# member) (0.25) (0.25)
Hours worked 0.01 0.01
weekly (0.03) (0.03)
Moved from -0.48 -
Canaã (1.63) -






(*) Standard error – signiﬁcant at 5%.
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8. Conclusion
This paper has presented new evidence on the value of formal property rights in
urban squatter community in a developing country. By studying the relationship
between the exogenous acquisition of a land title and child labor force participation,
the study has provided additional empirical support for the evidence that property
title appear to reduce the household demand for child labor in the majority of the
households.
Although existing studies indicate signiﬁcant eﬀect on access to credit, income,
home investment and fertility as Field (2007) and Andrade (2006), this particular
study aims at helping to ﬁll an important gap in the literature on property rights
and child labor force participation. Furthermore, the results indicate that unlike
employment responses to most welfare programs, which tend to involve an income
eﬀect that potentially removes adult households from the labor force, government
property titling programs appear to have a diﬀerent eﬀect – removes child labor
from the labor force.
It will certainly be interesting to apply the same survey in diﬀerent locations
and compare outcome results. Ravallion et al. (2005) argues that the same program
works well in one village but fails in another. An example is the Bangladesh’s Food
for Education Program. The program worked well in reaching the poor villages but
not in others, even in relatively close proximity. Furthermore, it will also add value
keeping tracking the same households with other surveys to check consistency and
robustness of the results overtime.
It is clear that understanding the multiple channels through which land titles
inﬂuence economic outcome is a particular important given governments across
the world are considering titling programs to address urban informality. In
addition, the results have potential implications for understanding labor market
frictions in developing countries (Goldsmith, 1995). In places characterized by high
levels of residential informality such as most of developing and poor countries,
informal property protection may constitute an important obstacle to labor market
adjustment. Hence, land title could be applied as an asset to improve public policy
actions that directly impact economic growth.
It is possible that the reduction of child labor has been caused by other factor not
embranced by the theory which supports this study. However, that is to appear.
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